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The general motivation of the paper by Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk is
animportantone.Variationinincomelevelsacrosscountriesisknownto
be explained less by inputs (physical and human capital) than by TFP
(total factor productivity). The difference is not necessarily technology.
Totakeonesetofexamples,duringtheheydayofcommunism,thecoun-
triesoftheSovietBloctendedtohavehighratesofinvestmentinphysical
and human capital and to have advanced technology—at least in certain
areas, such as aerospace. Yet real income per capita lagged increasingly
behind the West because of the inferior model of social organization.
Laura Alfaro and her coauthors work in the promising new line of re-
searchthatfocusesonfirmheterogeneity.Atleastitisnewintradetheory
(or “new new” to distinguish it from the Helpman‐Krugman new trade
theory based on trade in imperfect substitutes). The question is how effi-
ciently different countries allocate resources across firms. Some distort
the allocation of resources across firms, reducing overall TFP.
In the introduction, there is a good statement describing the policy
areas that bear examination:
These distortions should be interpreted as the different types of policies
that might generate these effects such as noncompetitive banking sys-
tems, product and labor market regulations, corruption, and trade re-
strictions. For example, specific producers might be offered, by
governments, special tax deals and contracts financed by taxes on other
production activities, and by noncompetitive banking systems, favor-
able interest rates on loans based on noneconomic factors, leading to
misallocation of credit across establishments. Corruption and trade re-
strictions might also result in less productive firms obtaining a larger
share of the market.
One couldaddtothelisttwo more items: industrial policyand theability of
governmenttoaddressexternalities,publicgoods,andsoforth,thoughIam
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terests are more likely to be problems. Antitrust policy (competition
p o l i c y )i st h ep l a c ew h e r et h ep u b l i cs e c t o ri sm o s tl i k e l yt ob ea b l et o
reduce distortions, as opposed to creating them. There is already a lot of
research on these topics, of course, but most of it is probably not phrased
in terms of firm heterogeneity.
The authors have a huge data set, WorldBase, from Dun & Bradstreet.
It includes 20 million firms in 79 countries. I always say, one can learn
more from a big data set and simple techniques than from a small data
set and fancy techniques. Whatever its flaws, it must be capable of
some important contributions to the state of our knowledge.
I would love to see tests of such propositions as the following:
1. Firmsthat areownedby well‐connected elitestend togeteasiercredit,
growing in size but not necessarily earnings, with an outcome that is
either good or (more likely) bad for national productivity.
2. Firms in export industries tend to be especially productive, and those
that are protected against import competition tend to be especially un-
productive.
3. Inthehigh‐technologysector,whereinnovationisall‐important,being
small is especially useful (firms needs to stay nimble and competitive) or
elsetheopposite(pharmaceuticalcompaniesneedtobelargeandpatent‐
protected, so that they can use profits from successful drugs to pay for
long‐term research in other areas that may not pay off).
4. Firms in certain sectors, such as agriculture or heavy industry, are fa-
voredoverotherssuchasservices,withnegativeeffectsonaggregateTFP.
5. Firms that are highly regulated tend to be less productive than those
that are not.
6. Firms that are privately owned tend to be either more or less produc-
tive than those that have to justify themselves to stockholders.
7. Firms in highly concentrated industries, although profitable, tend to
have low productivity.
The reader who might be led by the beginning of Alfaro et al.’s paper
to expect something along these lines will be disappointed. These are
not the sorts of hypotheses to be tested here.
The authors are concerned exclusively with one dimension of firm
heterogeneity: the size distribution of plants. Lack of data explains
why they do not test directly the proposition of interest: that large firms
are less productive.
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with the variables that would be necessary to test propositions such
as the seven above. But their focus appears to be narrow by choice, de-
rived from some recent literature, which in turn originated specifically
intwopapersofoutstandingpedigree:Lucas(1978)andMelitz(2003).I
can see how a model of good versus bad size distributions could be in-
teresting; but I object to leaping over all other kinds of firm heterogene-
ity to a framework in which firm size is assumed to be the only relevant
dimensionofheterogeneity.Imaginethatallfirmsarethesamesize,but
some are well connected or corrupt whereas others are not; some are
exporters whereas others are protected; some are in heavy industry
whereasothersareinservices;someareinsmalloligopolisticindustries
whereas others are in large competitive industries; some are regulated,
some are not; some are privately owned, some publicly traded, and so
forth. No variations in productivity along these dimensions are ad-
mitted in this paper.
The logic, taken from other papers such as Restuccia and Rogerson
(2007), is apparently that if resources are diverted across firms for any
reason other than productivity—whether it is government subsidies or
private market distortions—the result will be that bigger firms will on
average be less productive. Clever model. Within such a model, I can
indeed see how size dispersion might be a “sufficient statistic” for the
extent of distortion.
But in reality, as opposed to inside a model, this leaves out a lot. It
leaves out, for example, the seven questions listed above. Nor is this list
anywhere near exhaustive. I am not sure that firm size would even be
on my list of top 10 factors that determine national productivity. Korea
and Taiwan, two countries with similar starting points, both accom-
plished rapid productivity growth. Yet Korea did it via large firms
and chaebols, whereas Taiwanese firm size was typically much smaller.
That difference in size distribution hardly seems to have mattered.
It seems to me that the authors are not sufficiently aware of the leap
from a special model that focuses on heterogeneity of firms by size to a
realityinwhichsizedispersionistheonlykindofheterogeneitythatmat-
ters. I infer this because the leap from firm heterogeneity to size disper-
sion still occurs in a single inconspicuous footnote, footnote 2: “The
model implies a direct relation between productivity and size.” It isn’t
until after equation (13) that we are told the key assumption: “For the
purposesofthispaper,thedistributionofplantsizeisasummarystatistic
of the resource misallocation for each country.” After equation (17) the
very strong assumption underlying the calibration exercise is revealed:
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the dispersion of incomes be?”
The authors’ preliminary look at the data shows that most countries
have a higher share of the economy in small firms than in large ones,
and that this is especially true of the United States. They take the U.S.
distribution to be the desirable norm. This decision reflects a general
belief that the United States tends to do things right and a lack of ob-
vious alternatives. But presumably it also reflects a belief that (i) the
large role of small firms in the United States specifically reflects a rela-
tive absence of government subsidy and oligopolistic structure, which
is desirable; (ii) while size might be desirable in some cases, such as a
Microsoft or a Plough, the U.S. economy has the right number of such
firms, which is why the ideal structure is not taken to be atomistic; and
(iii) conspicuous failures in the U.S. system (Enron, Worldcom, mort-
gage brokers, Bear Stearns, subsidized farmers, etc.) are sufficiently rare
compared to other countries that they do not negate the results.
The exercise appears successful. The paper summarizes its conclu-
sions: “We calculated the implicit distortion needed to generate size dis-
tributions consistent with size histograms for a sample of 79 countries.
We found the loss in output caused by these distortions to be quantita-
tivelyimportant.Forourpreferredcalibration,themodelexplains0.58of
thelogvarianceofincomeperworker.Thisfigureshouldbecomparedto
the 0.42 success rate of the usual model.”
Even if we were to grant the proposition that size is a sufficient sta-
tistic for distortions, I still see two more difficulties. One is that the data
are at the establishment level (plants), because of data availability,
whereas the taxes, subsidies, and other distortions with which we are
concerned are overwhelmingly at the company level.
Theotherdifficultyisthatcalibrationstrikesmeasaveryweaktoolfor
testing such a hypothesis. There is a big difference between saying that
(i) a simulation based on countries’ observed deviations from the U.S.
size distribution is capable of explaining the observed variability in na-
tional incomes and saying that (ii) the variation in size distribution is in
fact associated with variation in income. To take a potentially alarming
example,whatifbigfirmsaregood,notbad,andtheextentofdeviations
ofcountries’sizedistributionfromtheU.S.distributioniscapableofgen-
erating the right income variance because it captures how good countries
are rather than how bad countries are? Would the authors’ calibration
methodology be able to tell the difference? I hope so! Otherwise, one
might as well test the theory “crime doesn’tp a y ”by looking at the absolute
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citizens and ignoring the sign.
Endnote
1. The first time through, I could not tell if this was the hypothesis or that large firms
are more productive. Or both, or neither? Some more complicated hypothesis about the
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